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The Federal Courts of Appeals, Unpublished Decisions,
and the "No-Citation Rule"
DIONE CHRISTOPHER GREENE*
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended limiting the
publication of court opinions to decrease the workload of federal courts.' It is unknown
exactly what was stated at the conference since it operates as a closed session, no
public record is kept, and the Freedom of Information Act does not cover it.2 But the
conference did reveal that the number of published opinions was increasing, and that
this was becoming a tremendous burden on federal courts to maintain their
administrative facilities. 3 Almost a decade later, after another dramatic increase in the
courts of appeals' cases, the policy of limiting the publication of opinions became
generally accepted by all federal circuits. Consequently, about eighty percent of all
opinions issued by the federal courts of appeals today are designated as unpublished.
Limiting the publication of opinions was not the only method used to facilitate the
reduction of the federal court workload. Eventually, federal courts also adopted "no-
citation" rules, which either limit or prohibit citation to unpublished opinions.' In
effect, the rules prevent attorneys from relying on cases that are not published in the
federal reporters,7 even if those court opinions could support their client's cause of
action. The no-citation rules sparked much criticism and constitutional debate over the
years. The controversy ultimately induced the Judicial Conference in 2005 to propose
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which was recently adopted by the Supreme
Court8 The rule allows lawyers to cite unpublished opinions issued on or after January
* Notes & Comments Editor, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 81; J.D. Candidate, 2006,
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 2002, University of Missouri-Kansas
City. I would like to thank Professor Dan Conkle and Stacey Drews for their insights,
comments, and suggestions. All errors are attributable to the author.
1. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE].
2. Citizens for Judicial Accountability, Appeals-Federal Court,
http://www.judicialaccountability.org/appealsfederalcourt.htm (last visited Jan 30, 2006).
3. See 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 1; see also Anne Coyle, Note, A Modest
Reform: The New Rule 32.1 Permitting Citation to Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 72 FORDHAm L. REv. 2471, 2471 (2004).
4. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (1974); See also Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L.
Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J.
App. PRAC. & PROCESS 251, 253-57 (2001).
5. Mark Hansen, Citing of Unpublished Opinions Endorsed, 4 ABA J. EREPORT 40 (Sept.
30, 2005), http://www.abanet.org/joumal/ereport/s30unpub.html.
6. E.g., 2D Cm. R. 0.23; 7TH Cm. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9TH Cm. R. 36-3(a)-(b).
7. Note that although a federal court opinion is designated as "unpublished," it is still
accessible through publicly available electronic databases or through the court clerk's office.
8. Proposed Rule 32.1 provides, "A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of
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1, 2007 in federal courts nationwide. 9 If unaltered by Congress, the rule will take effect
beginning in 2007.
Rule 32.1 is a significant step toward remedying the adverse effects of the no-
citation rules. However, by not prohibiting federal courts from disallowing attorneys to
cite to opinions before 2007, the proposed rule is severely limited.'0 In other words,
attorneys in federal circuits that strictly limit citation to unpublished opinions will not
benefit from Rule 32.1 if the unpublished decision that they rely upon came before
2007. Because of this substantial limitation, some of the constitutional problems of the
no-citation rules remain.
This Note provides a broad overview of the history of unpublished opinions, the no-
citation rules, and the constitutional attacks on the rules. Part I discusses the purposes
of appellate courts and usefulness of written opinions. Part II looks at the court
caseload crisis, the responses to it, and the connection between unpublished decisions
and the no-citation rules. Part III explains the purposes behind the no-citation rules and
review arguments made for and against them. This Note ultimately argues that because
of the 2007 limitation, Rule 32.1 will not prevent the no-citation rules from violating
the Constitution, particularly the First Amendment. Therefore, the no-citation rules
should be abolished in their entirety, allowing lawyers to cite all prior published
decisions.
I. THE PURPOSES OF APPELLATE COURTS AND OPINIONS
Article HI of the Constitution provides that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United
States."'" Congress is empowered to create federal courts to review and to take a
second, independent look at potential errors made by powerful single-court judges . 2
Written court of appeals opinions facilitate this review, not only by resolving the
particular disputes between litigants, but also by advancing and clarifying the state of
the law.13 Court of appeals opinions establish precedents that guide and rectify lower
court decisions.
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been (i)
designated as 'unpublished,' 'not for publication,' 'non-precedential,' 'not precedent,' or the
like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007." FED. R. App. PRoc. 32.1, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orderscourtorders/frap06.pdf.
9. Id.; Tony Mauro, Court Opinions No Longer Cites Unseen, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 26,
2005, at 8; see also Hansen, supra note 5.
10. Some have also criticized Rule 32.1 as being a "modest reform," since "[i]t takes no
position on whether, or under what circumstances, courts should issue unpublished opinions...
[or] suggest what weight courts should accord to unpublished opinions." Coyle, supra note 3, at
2475.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
12. See Charles E. Carpenter. Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the
Ends of Expediencyfor Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L.
REV. 235, 248 (1998); see also Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion:
Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87
MICH. L. REV. 940, 941 (1989).
13. See Carpenter, supra note 12, at 248.
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In providing written opinions, "it is a basic principle of the administration ofjustice
that like cases should be decided alike." 14 "[W]hen an appellate court changes,
modifies, or affirms a principle or rule of law, the clear impact on our common law
system justifies a written opinion in which the court explains its reasons ... ." 5 Even
when the court merely resolves a particular dispute and does nothing else, written
opinions serve to ensure the judges' decisions are well thought-out, and not immune
from public criticism.
Some argue that although opinions that serve only to resolve particular disputes
should be written, they still should not be published. 16 This way, the "unimportant"
cases do not "clog up the reporters which contain the 'real' common law." 17 Selective
publication separates the important opinions from the "valueless" ones, decreases
publication costs, and promotes judicial efficiency. 8 But even if these reasons are true,
unpublished and uncitable opinions are still seen by many as secretive, incidentally
reducing the judiciary's accountability to the public.' 9 In a fair legal system, it is
important that the law be applied consistently in similar cases. A citable opinion
"dispels the perception of the judiciary as -a self-regulating, secret society." 20 It is
significant both to fulfill the courts' primary functions and to disseminate to the public
reasons why the court decided the case the way it did, even if the content of the opinion
goes only to the merits of the case.
II. THE INCREASE IN CASELOAD AND RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
This Part looks at the court caseload crisis and the responses to it. Section A
discusses factors contributing to the crisis, such as population, crime, and diversity
jurisdiction. The Subsections then highlight the responses to the crises, including
changes in judicial staff, the policy of not publishing opinions, and the no-citation rule.
A. Court Overload
Since the 1960s, several factors have contributed to a significant increase in the
federal caseload. First, the courts of appeals' caseload began to drastically expand in
the 1960s, correlating with changes in the population." From 1964 to 1984, the
caseloads of the United States District Courts grew by 202 percent.22 Between 1952
14. RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 3 (4th ed. 1991).
15. Carpenter, supra note 12, at 248.
16. See e.g., Carpenter, supra note 12, at 249 n.25 (quoting RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 122 (1985)) ("[M]any appeals that formerly would have
been decided with a full opinion ... are now decided with an unpublished opinion. These are
not frivolous appeals; one-line treatment ['affirmed,' for example] would be inappropriate. They
call for an opinion and they get it, but it is not published.").
17. Id. at 249.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also infra note 23 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 248.
21. Richard B. Hoffman & William M. Lucianovic, Long Ranch Planning: A Reality in the
Judicial Branch, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1599, 1601 (1995).
22. Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts at the Crossroads, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252
2006] 1505
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and 1982, as the nation's population increased by fifty percent, appeals to the circuit
courts increased by over 800 percent.2 3 From the 1990s to 2005, the federal court
caseload has continued to drastically increase.
24
A second factor contributing to the increase in federal caseloads is new statutory
rights, such as prisoner petitions, civil rights, social security claims, and labor law
claims.25 Third, the increasing caseload can be attributed to the retention of diversity
jurisdiction, which many argue should be abolished.26 A study by the Federal Judicial
Center in 1988 found that diversity jurisdiction cost the federal government $131
million (one-tenth of the federal judicial budget in 1988) and consumed the equivalent
27
of the workload of 193 district judges and 22 appellate court judges. The Federal
Courts Study Committee recommended abolishing most diversity jurisdiction, partly
because it accounted for one-fourth of the cases in district courts and one-half of the
civil trials.28 Fourth is crime. Interestingly, the Federal Courts Study Committee stated
that "the federal courts' most pressing problem-today and for the immediate future-
stems from the unprecedented number of federal narcotics prosecutions." 29 Drug cases
have grown by more than 280 percent since 1980.30 Fifth, miscellaneous factors, such
as broad judicial interpretations of constitutional and statutory provisions, a great
increase in the number of lawyers, free legal services for indigent criminal defendants,
more educated citizens, and increased prosperity in the United States.
31
Although many of the factors contributing to the increase in caseload are highly
desirable, they have placed immense pressure on the courts of appeals to process cases
efficiently. Those factors also raise an underlying normative question-how much is
the legal profession and society willing to sacrifice in order to accommodate the ever-
increasing caseload? Accommodating the caseload has already led to several
significant judicial and public consequences, to which we turn next.
1. Expansion in Judicial Staff
Judges' legal staffs have greatly increased over the years to help judges respond to
32the increasing caseload. Among the increased staff members are law clerks, staff
attorneys, visiting judges, secretaries, and other legal personnel. But this increase in
staff has not been accomplished without criticism. Some have described the process as
(1987).
23. Id.
24. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Courts Caseload,
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/statisticsalreports.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
25. Miner, supra note 22, at 252-53.
26. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects
and Potential for Further Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 963, 966 (1979) (arguing that abolishing
diversity jurisdiction would decrease the federal caseload).
27. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 41 (1990); See also Debra L. Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 119 (2003).
28. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITEE, supra 27, at 38-39.
29. Id. at 36.
30. Id.
31. Miner, supra note 22, at 255; see also POSNER, supra note 16, at 59-93.
32. JONATHAN M. COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OFCOURT ORGANIZATION
ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 3 (2002).
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"bureaucratization, 33 disapproving of the judiciary's reliance on law clerks and staff
members to help it operate.
34
However, there is nothing new about judges employing staff members to help them
fulfill their judicial role. As early as 1875, Justice Horace Gray of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court employed a law clerk.35 Over time, obtaining law clerks
became common practice, and Congress authorized the employment of staff members
to assist judges. 36 Law clerks and other legal staff have become an integral part of the
legal system, positively impacting the judiciary by facilitating judges in performing
their many duties.
2. The Unpublished Opinion
The "unpublished opinion" policy is another method to decrease the workload of
the courts.37 The policy arguably provides several benefits. First, judges save time by
not being required to prepare the opinion for publication. 38 When a decision is
published, the judge must write for a general audience and elucidate every important
aspect of the case. However, an unpublished opinion has a more limited audience,
allowing the judge to write a truncated set of facts and employ a shorthand analysis of
the parties' arguments.39 Second, litigants have access to a quicker judicial result,
40 41instead of being delayed for the opinion to be published. ° Third, it saves money.
Clients save money because attorneys spend less time researching cases with little or
no precedential value. Also, libraries, firms, and other legal entities save money by not
being required to purchase more books filled with "irrelevant" cases.42
These justifications, by themselves, are not sufficient to limit the publication of
opinions. A standard must be used to determine which opinions will be published and
which opinions will not. Each court of appeals has its own criteria, but generally, an
opinion will be published if it:
(a) Establishes a new rule of law, alters, or modifies an existing rule of law, or
calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have been generally
overlooked;
33. Id.
34. Id. at 9.
35. See JOHN B. OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICLAL PROCESS:
PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN AMERICAN COURTS 10-11
(1980); Carpenter, supra note 12, at 87.
36. Pub. L. No. 71-373, 46 Stat. 774 (1930).
37. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
38. See Robel, supra note 12, at 942.
39. Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian's Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 LAW
LIBR. J. 475,477 (2004).
40. See id. Of course, a court could deliver the result directly to the litigants to avoid delays
to the litigants and then later publish the written opinion.
41. See e.g., Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REv. 541, 547-48 (1997) (discussing the assertion
that unpublished decisions save money).
42. Id.
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(b) Applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those
in previous published opinions applying the rule;
(c) Explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of existing decisional or enacted
law;
(d) Creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within the circuit or between
the circuit and another circuit;
(e) Concerns or discusses a factual or legal issue of significant public interest; or
(f) Is rendered in a case that has been reviewed previously and its merits
addressed by an opinion of the United States Supreme Court.
(g) An opinion may also be published if it: [i]s accompanied by a concurring or
dissenting opinion; or reverses the decision below or affirms it upon different
grounds.43
Of course, it is constitutionally permissible for courts to not publish opinions. The
Framers of the Constitution knew that limited publication ofjudicial decisions was the
rule, not the exception. 44 Before the ratification of the Constitution, private reporting
and official reporting in the United States was almost non-existent. 45 Therefore,
unpublished opinions by themselves do not invoke much antagonism, especially since
the opinions are accessible anyway though electronic databases. But it is the
unpublished opinion's successor, the "no-citation" rule which invites controversy. If
courts issue decisions from the bench, there is no constitutional problem. The problems
arise when courts prohibit reference to previously decided decisions.
3. The No-Citation Rule
The no-citation rule is meant to effectuate the objectives of not publishing
opinions.46 That is, allowing citation would frustrate the purposes of selective
publication. The problem with having only an unpublished opinion policy is that it
does not stop lawyers from finding them and relying on the unpublished decision for
valid and binding authority. But aren't opinions supposed to be binding and valid
authority?
In any case, after the courts' adoption of selective publication, it was reasoned that
judicial efficiency would still be frustrated if the opinions were citable.47 It was also
"argued that if citation to unpublished decisions were permitted, a market for the
opinions would develop." 48 Legal practitioners and law libraries would need to be
constantly updated on these unpublished cases, and this would impose substantial
financial costs upon them. Additionally, the no-citation rule prevents the courts from
43. 5TH Cm. R. 47.5.1; see also 4THCIR. R. 36(a), 6"-CIR. R. 206(a)
44. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800-
1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28 (1959); see also infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
45. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 9 (1977).
46. See Shuldberg, supra note 41, at 549-51; see also supra notes 37-39 and
accompanying text.
47. Id.
48. Shuldberg, supra note 41, at 549-50.
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making "too much law," which arguably would make it difficult for attorneys to
research all relevant decisions.49
The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits prohibit the citation to
unpublished opinions,5 0 while six other circuits discourage it.5' A typical restrictive no-
citation rule provides, "unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not
binding precedent .... Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court may not be
cited to or by the courts of this circuit ....52 The obvious effects of such a rule are (1)
it makes unpublished opinions not binding precedent, which means that courts do not
have to follow them and (2) it prevents attorneys from relying on such cases. These
effects present constitutional problems.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NO-CITATION RULE
Do courts have the power to prevent cases from being used by attorneys who are
fighting for their clients' interests? Although this was a subject of great interest when
the no-citation rules were first promulgated, an intense debate started when the Eighth
Circuit ruled in 2001 that its no-citation rule, insofar as it allowed them to avoid the
precedential effect of prior decisions, was unconstitutional.
A. The Eighth Circuit Ruling
In 1996, Faye Anastasoff mailed her tax refund claim to the Internal Revenue
Service for taxes paid three years earlier.53 The Internal Revenue Service denied her
refund claim under federal statute 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (b), which limited refunds to taxes
paid over the past three years. 4 Anastasoff's claim was received one day past the three
year cut-off.
In many cases, the "Mailbox Rule" would save claims such as Anastasoff's, because
under that rule, claims are deemed received and filed by the Internal Revenue Service
when they are mailed. But 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (b) states that claims are received and filed
when they actually reach the office of the IRS, which may be several days after the
claims were mailed. If Anastasoff's claim was deemed received when it was mailed
under the Mailbox Rule, it would not have been late, and she probably would have won
her case. But since the Internal Revenue Service refused to apply the Mailbox Rule,
Anastasoff was denied her refund.
49. Gerken, supra note 39, at 477.
50. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 7TH CiR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9TICIR. R. 36-3(a)-(b).
51. See, e.g., 8TH CiR. R. 28(i) ("[Unpublished opinions] are not precedent and parties
generally should not cite them .... Parties may... cite an unpublished opinion of this court if
the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another
court would serve as well."); 10TH CIR. R. 36-3 ("Citation of an unpublished opinion is
disfavored. But an unpublished opinion may be cited if: (1) it has persuasive value... that has
not been addressed in a published opinion; and (2) it would assist the court in its disposition.").
52. See, e.g., 9THCIR. R. 36-3. Note that citation is available in limited circumstances, such
as when relevant to collateral estoppel, res judicata, double jeopardy, and other rare situations.
Id.
53. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000).
54. Id.
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Anastasoff subsequently filed suit, arguing the Court should apply the Mailbox
Rule, while the Internal Revenue Service argued that 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (b) was the
appropriate standard.55 Fortunately for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court
had already dealt with this exact issue in a prior case. But unfortunately, the case on
point was an unpublished decision. Therefore, the case was "not precedent, and parties
should not generally cite" to it.
56
In Christie v. United States, which is an unpublished decision, the Eighth Circuit
held the Mailbox Rule would not save claims such as Anastasoff's. 57 If the Eighth
Circuit simply followed Christie, then Anastasoff would lose, and the case would be
quickly over. But Anastasoff argued that because Christie was an unpublished
decision, it was not precedent under the Eighth Circuit's no-citation rule, and the Court
could therefore still rule in her favor by ignoring the prior case.
58
The Eighth Circuit, aware of the injustice and inconsistency that departing from
prior rulings (albeit in unpublished decisions) could serve, held "the portion of [the no-
citation rule] that declares that unpublished opinions are not precedent is
unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports to confer on the federal courts a
power that goes beyond the 'judicial' [power]. 59
The Court first reasoned that "[i]nherent in every judicial decision is a declaration
and interpretation of a general principle and rule of law. This declaration... must be
applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties." 6° If the Court was to deviate
from applying the same rule to similarly situated parties, the Court would be going
beyond the text of its Article III powers (to decide "cases and controversies") in the
Constitution.
Second, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that historically, the Framers of the
Constitution stood firmly for the proposition that "it is an established rule to abide by
former precedents. ' '61 The Court explored how the Framers were concerned about the
arbitrary powers of government, stating, "the doctrine of precedent was not merely well
established; it was the historic method of judicial decision-making, and well regarded
as a bulwark of judicial independence in past struggles for liberty." 62 Historically,
therefore, judges were limited to determining the law, maintaining the law, and
expounding the law.
63
Third, the Eighth Circuit provided a "separation of powers" argument, reasoning
that "[i]f judges had the legislative power to depart from established legal principles,
'the subject would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then
regulated only by their own opinions." '64 The Court also quoted Hamilton, stating,
55. Id.
56. 8TH Cm. R. 28(i).
57. Christie v. United States, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per
curiam).
58. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
60. Id. at 899-900 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 900 (quoting 1 SIR WmLLM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *69 (1765)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 901 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at *258-59).
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"'[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be
bound by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in
every particular case that come before them."' 65 Separation of powers principles
therefore limit courts from adopting rules that run counter to the courts' ascribed
powers granted by the Constitution. Some rules, such as the no-ciation rule, are better
left to the legislature.
Finally, as a policy matter, the Court stated that judges should not be able "to
choose for themselves, from among all the cases they decide, those that they will
follow in the future, and those that they need not. ' 66 "Those courts are saying to the
bar: 'We may have decided this question the opposite way yesterday, but this does not
bind us today, and what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday.' '67 The
Court then concluded by finding Anastasoff's claim was rejected directly by the
unpublished prior decision in Christie, and the no-citation rule was unconstitutional in
regards to allowing judges to depart from precedent.68
B. Responses to Anastasoff
Not long after the Eighth Circuit's ruling, the Anastasoff decision received
criticism. 69 Some scholars argued that Anastasoff was simply about "stare decisis" and
not precedent-although the Framers intended for judges to be bound by precedent, the
Framers did not mean for judges to necessarily be bound by one case.70 In any case, the
Anastasoff decision was soon vacated as moot since the parties ultimately resolved
their dispute, and Anastasoff received her refund from the government in full. 71 The
Court held that since "the case [had] become moot... [t]he constitutionality of that
portion of [the rule] which says that unpublished opinions have no precedential effect
remains an open question in this Circuit.
72
Although the Anastasoff decision was vacated as moot, courts continued to use the
decision as persuasive authority. District courts and attorneys cited the Anastasoff
decision to support their citations to unpublished opinions.73 However, when an
65. Id. at 901 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 531 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem
Library ed., 1938)).
66. Id. at 904.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Gregory S. Fisher, Soundoff: Citing to the Unpublished Opinion, 10 ARIZ.
Arr'v 8 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.westlaw.com (40-FEB Ariz. Att'y 8).
70. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text; Jennifer Adams, Comment, Law Today,
Gone Tomorrow, 53 BAYLOR L. REv. 659 (2001) (arguing that the no-citation rule violates stare
decisis and the intent of the Framers). But see Drew R. Quitschau, Case Note, Anastasoff v.
United States: Uncertainty in the Eighth Circuit-Is there a Constitutional Right to Cite
Unpublished Opinions?, 54 ARK. L. REV. 847, 878 (2002) ("[Tlhe no-citation rule violates stare
decisis .... Our forefathers never intended the courts to have such unbridled discretion ... as
prescribed by the no-citation rule.").
71. See Anastasoff, 235 F.3d. 1054.
72. Id. at 1056.
73. See Leane C. Medford, Anastasoff v. U.S.: The Continuing Controversy over the
Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 20-9 AM: BANKR. INST. J. 26 (Nov. 2001);
McGuinness v. Pepe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D. Mass. 2001); Encore Video Inc. v. City of San
15112006]
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attorney in the Ninth Circuit cited to an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ordered counsel to show cause as to why he should not be disciplined for
violating the no-citation rule.74 The attorney argued that the Ninth Circuit's rule, which
is similar to the Eighth Circuit's, may be unconstitutional. The attorney relied on
Anastasoff as persuasive authority. The Ninth Circuit repudiated the Eighth Circuit's
holding and held that the no-citation rule is constitutional in all aspects.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by stating "Anastasoff may be the first case in
the history of the Republic to hold that the phrase 'judicial Power' encompasses a
specific command that limits the power of the federal courts. 75 The Court essentially
argued throughout its opinion that (1) the text of the Constitution, in particular the
"judicial Power," does not contain any limitation on the courts; and (2) historically,
"most decisions of the federal courts were not viewed as binding precedent," and the
Framers never would have viewed non-precedential decisions as "inconsistent with the
exercise ofjudicial power." 76 The Court concluded by finding the no-citation rule was
not unconstitutional, stating "unlike the [Eighth Circuit], we are unable to find within
Article III of the Constitution a requirement that all case dispositions and orders issued
by appellate courts be binding authority. 77
C. Arguments For and Against the No-Citation Rule
This Section provides a very brief description of various arguments made for and
against the no-citation rule. They are divided into the following: (1) historical
arguments, (2) textual arguments, (3) separation of powers arguments, (4) policy
arguments, (5) due process arguments, and (6) First Amendment arguments. Many of
these arguments can be easily manipulated to come out one way or another and thus are
not proper indicators of the constitutionality of the no-citation rule. The First
Amendment argument, on the other hand, when analyzed in light of the Supreme
Court's doctrine in context-based and context-neutral regulations, points more strongly
to the unconstitutionality of the no-citation rule. Therefore, Section D will treat the
First Amendment argument separately and in more detail because of the peculiar
constitutional concerns it raises.
First, the historical analysis can lead to the conclusion that either the no-citation rule
does or does not violate the Constitution. The court in Anastasoff relied partly upon
this method of analysis. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Framers intended for
judges to abide by prior precedents, adhere to stare decisis, and be limited in the way
judges reach decisions. 7 8 But the Ninth Circuit in Hart, which also relied partly on
Antonio, 200 WL 33348240 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2000), rev'd, 310 F.3d 812 (2002), superseded,
330 F.3d 288 (2003) (arguing that the unpublished decision rule of the Fifth Circuit is similar to
the Third Circuit, and since the court's decision could have been supported by an unpublished
decision, the rule should be re-examined).
74. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a)-(b)
("Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not binding precedent ... [and
generally] may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit.").
75. Hart, 266 F.3d. at 1160.
76. Id. at 1163.
77. Id. at 1180.
78. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d, at 901.
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history, concluded the exact opposite as did the Eighth Circuit.79 Perhaps this is due to
the ambiguity of what the Framers actually thought, since they reasoned differently
many times about the same issues.
Second, the textual arguments based on the Constitution suffer from the same
deficiency as the historical arguments when it comes to the no-citation rule. As already
seen, the Eighth Circuit argued that the no-citation rule goes beyond the judicial power
of Article III. The Ninth Circuit concluded the exact opposite. "[W]e are unable to find
within Article Ill of the Constitution a requirement that all case dispositions and orders
issued by appellate courts be binding authority."80 Since the text of the Constitution
does not explicitly say courts can adopt a no-citation rule, nor that they cannot, the
textual argument can be used to support two opposite conclusions.
The third argument concerns the separation of powers. Some argue that it is simply
not the courts' job to promulgate rules such as the no-citation rule. Rules that are this
restrictive are better left to members of Congress, who are elected representatives, not
judges. Although this argument is not as malleable as the two previous, it can at least
be downplayed. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, courts adopt procedures and rules all
the time. Taking away this power would make the courtroom chaotic. Further, a court
would be abdicating its authority if it did not respond adequately to judicial needs with
necessary rules. However, as explained below, the no-citation rule is not a necessary
rule, and judicial efficiency would not be compromised without it.
Policy arguments are the fourth type. At one end is the argument suggesting that the
no-citation rule gives judges the power to be arbitrary and conceal what they do,8 2
while the rule also adversely affects litigants relying on unpublished decisions. It is not
fair today for the courts to depart from principles they declared valid yesterday. One
commentator suggested, "Our forefathers never intended the courts to have such
unbridled discretion."8 3 Also, the Eighth Circuit asserted that courts who declare they
are not bound by unpublished cases are essentially telling the public that they have the
power to decide one case in one direction for one party and then give the opposite
result on a similar set of facts to another party the next day.84 Justice and consistency
demand much more, and the no-citation rule goes too far.
But, on the other hand, the fact remains that courts are in crisis. There are far too
many cases for judges to deal with, most of which are irrelevant to the present issue.
Here, judges do perform quality work in their task and diligently work to ensure that
like cases are decided alike. Further, judges are still accountable to the public since all
opinions are accessible in the court clerks' office or through electronic databases.
Academics, attorneys, and litigants are free to criticize the court for an inappropriate
ruling. Attorneys are well-served by unpublished opinions because they do not have to
sort through a mountain of unnecessary opinions to find relevant cases. And the public
is also well-served because tax money is saved; the opinions that do change the law
and could affect them are published.
79. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1164.
80. See Hart, 266 F.3d 1155.
81. See, e.g., Anastasoff, 223 F.3d, at 899.
82. See Carpenter, supra note 12.
83. See Quitschau, supra note 70, at 878.
84. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Fifth are due process arguments. Opponents of the no-citation rule urge that since
the Supreme Court has held that "abrogation of deeply-rooted common law procedure,
without an adequate replacement or justification, is violative of procedural due
process[,]" then so too does the no-citation rule.85 When the Supreme Court looks at
deeply-rooted common law procedures, it carefully examines English and American
legal history. 6 It has been argued that a review of legal history indicates that litigants
have long been able to cite to previously decided decisions, regardless of whether an
opinion was published or not.87 Here, since barring attorneys from using previously
decided cases usurps the common law tradition and since there is not an adequate
replacement of the tradition, the relatively new citation rule violates due process.
88
The counterargument is that under the common law, judges have never been barred
from limiting citation, even if they never exercised that power. A New Jersey statute,
enacted in 1799, forbade citation of English cases, commentaries, and expositions of
common law.89 Further, there is nothing in the common law to suggest that attorneys
were completely free to cite any case they want, without limit to the amount of cases. If
case briefs submitted to the court must be limited in pages, then cites must necessarily
be limited, albeit indirectly.
D. The First Amendment Analysis
First Amendment guarantees make the constitutionality of no-citation rules
extremely doubtful. This is because the government is restricting speech that is used to
address a legal right. Perhaps even more unfortunate is that the speech the government
is restricting is speech that originated from the government. That is, courts are
prohibiting or constraining the very speech that they themselves wrote and mandated.
There is no obvious reason to prohibit this speech, since it is not deemed a threat to
society. Attorneys are simply attempting to use government speech to advocate the
cause of their clients. Unfortunately, attorneys are restrained by the no-citation rule.
The First Amendment limits this restraint.
This Section explains the Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis as applied to
both content-based and content-neutral regulations. As discussed below in the
Subsections, the Supreme Court utilizes a test called the "O'Brien Analysis" to analyze
whether the government violates a First Amendment right. The first part of the O'Brien
test inquires into whether a government restriction is "content-based." If the restriction
is content-based, the Court applies "strict scrutiny," unless the restriction targets a
category of unprotected speech (for example, obscenity is content-based speech that is
not protected by the First Amendment). But if the speech is protected by the First
85. See Lance A. Wade, Honda meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument
Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REv. 695,717
(2001) (discussing the due process argument and how the Supreme Court analyzes English and
American history to find due process violations); Jennifer Adams, Law Today, Gone Tomorrow,
53 BAYLOR L. REv. 659, 680 (2001).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. GRANT GILMoRE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 22 (1977).
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Amendment (for example, political speech), then strict scrutiny applies, which makes it
very unlikely the government restriction will be upheld.
However, a government restriction on speech may be "content-neutral." The
distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions makes a significant
difference, because "content-neutral" restrictions have more of a chance to be upheld
than "content-based restrictions." For a law to be treated as content-neutral, the
government interest behind the law must be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression (for example, if the government bans public nudity in a particular area not
because of its disdain for the message that nudity will convey, but because the
government thinks that crime will increase as a result of the nudity, the ban is content-
neutral). For the reasons stated below, the no-citation rule is probably content-neutral,
not content-based. But its content-neutral status does not prevent it from violating the
Constitution.
1. Content-Based Restrictions
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the
freedom of speech."'9° At its plain meaning, the First Amendment appears simple and
unqualified. However, "all" speech is clearly not protected (e.g., bribery, perjury,
agreement to commit murder).9' The question is what type of speech is protected, and
what type of speech is not.
In general, when the government regulates speech, it regulates through either
content-based or content-neutral restrictions. 9 2 A content-based regulation is a
regulation that is related to the communicative impact of speech. For example, in
Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, the state of
New York passed a law to prevent serial murderers and criminals from writing and
profiting from books about their crimes and victims. 9 3 The Supreme Court
unanimously invalidated the statute, stating "[T]he government's ability to impose
content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may effectively
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace .... The [State] law is such a
content-based statute. It singles out.., and it is directed only at works with a specified
content." 94 Because the law was content-based, the court went on to apply strict
scrutiny, finding it unconstitutional. 95
90. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text (discussing categories of unprotected
speech).
92. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 46
(1987) (elucidating the Supreme Court's doctrine on content-based and content-neutral
restrictions). Alternatively, some have proposed looking at the no-citation rule as a prior
restraint. See, e.g., Marla Brooke Tusk, The No-Citation Rules as Prior Restraint on Attorney
Speech, 103 COLtJM. L. REv. 1202 (2003).
93. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991).
94. Id. at 116.
95. Id.
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As stated above, "what level of scrutiny applies is determined by whether the
[prohibition] is related to the suppression of expression."% When the Court employs
strict scrutiny, the government must show (1) that it has a compelling interest for
regulating speech and (2) that it has adopted a necessary means of regulation (or in
other words, the regulation must be narrowly tailored). 97 Content-based restrictions are
treated with more scrutiny than content-neutral laws because they discriminate based
on the message of certain types of expression.9" As the Court stated in Texas v.
Johnson, "[when] expression [is] restricted because of the content of the message...
[w]e must subject the State's asserted interest.., to the most 'exacting scrutiny.' 99
Another example of the Court applying strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions is
Cohen v. California, where the defendant was observed in the Los Angeles County
Courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the words "fuck the draft."' Cohen was
convicted of violating a California law which prohibited "maliciously and willfully
disturb[ing] the peace.., or person [by] offensive conduct."' 0 ' The Court held that
"the State certainly lacks power to punish Cohen for the underlying content of the
message ... ,,02 The Court went on to state that "[t]hose in the Los Angeles
courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities by simply
averting their eyes."' 0 3 The Court in subsequent cases applied this same exacting
standard to laws and regulations based on speech content, especially those dealing with
political speech.
It would be remiss not to point out at this stage of the analysis that some content-
based restrictions are not protected by the First Amendment, and therefore the Supreme
Court will not invoke strict scrutiny. Some forms of speech are deemed unprotected
because they are harmful to society. For example, the government can place
restrictions on "incitement."'04 Briefly, incitement is content-based speech intended to
produce unlawful conduct that is clearly likely to present an immediate danger.'0 5
"Fighting words" are another example of categorically unprotected speech."l ° For
example, in Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness distributed literature on the street while
denouncing all religion.'0 7 When a crowd became hostile towards Chaplinsky, a police
officer escorted him away to the City Marshal. An argument ensued between
Chaplinsky and the Marshal, and Chaplinsky called the Marshal a "God damned
96. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000).
97. Id.
98. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITrLIONAL LAW
984-96 (5th ed. 2004) (providing a general overview of the Supreme Court's First Amendment
doctrine).
99. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 ("If the regulation [is] content-based, it would be considered
presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny.").
100. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
101. Id. at 16.
102. Id. at 18.
103. Id. at 21.
104. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
105. Id.
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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racketeer" and a "damn Fascist." The Court unanimously upheld New Hampshire's
prosecution of Chaplinsky under the state's prohibition of "fighting words."' 08 Other
categories of unprotected content-based speech include libel, 0 9 obscenity,"0 and child
pornography. 11
Does the Supreme Court's categorization analysis apply to the no-citation rule? It
does not. This is because although courts prohibit or restrict the use of a certain
category of cases (i.e., unpublished opinions), this prohibition is (1) not deemed
immoral and harmful to society, as the other forms of speech mentioned above; and (2)
not labeled by the Court as "unprotected"-unlike the other unprotected categories.
Therefore, we must deal with the Court's methodology in handling content-based
restrictions that target protected speech.
The Supreme Court applies the O'Brien test in analyzing whether the First
Amendment has been violated by content-based restrictions."' 1 2 The O'Brien test is
basically a balancing test. This balancing test is used because the Court recognizes that
the government may have a legitimate interest in regulating speech, but at the same
time, this interest may intrude upon an individual's legitimate interest to exercise free
expression. Because strict scrutiny is applied to content-based restrictions, the balance
usually tips in favor of the litigant, not the government. For example, in Simon &
Schuster (also discussed above), 13 the State impeded criminals from writing and
profiting from books about their crimes. The Court recognized the State had a
legitimate interest in restricting the speech, stating "the State ... has an undisputed
compelling interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes."', 14 But
the Supreme Court also found that a legitimate First Amendment right is at stake, and
the law "singles out.., and it is directed only at works with a specified content."'" 5
After balancing the different interests at stake against one another, the Court applied
strict scrutiny and found the restriction unconstitutional since it was not a necessary
means (or narrowly tailored) of regulation 116
Some argue that the no-citation rule violates the First Amendment because it
imposes a content-based restriction on speech without a compelling state interest."i
7
108. Id. at 569.
109. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Note however, that only the most
malicious forms of libel are unprotected. Id.
110. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
111. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
112. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Clark v. Comty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In the case of O'Brien, O'Brien was
convicted for burning his Selective Service certificate to protest the military draft. A two track
analysis was adopted in this case to analyze content-based and content-neutral regulations by the
government. The Supreme Court employed this two-track analysis in all other major First
Amendment cases.
113. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991).
114. Id. at 119.
115. Id. at 116.
116. Id. at 123.
117. See, e.g., Quitschau, supra note 70, at 875 (explaining various arguments, including the
First Amendment, which would declare the no-citation rule unconstitutional).
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According to this argument, the no-citation rule is a government regulation aimed at
the content or communicative impact of speech. 18 The content that the government is
aiming at is the case or opinion itself, which is a record of how the court previously
decided a case.' 19 Since the restriction is based on the content of the cases, the Court
will employ strict scrutiny, which requires a compelling state interest. 120 The First
Amendment interest is unquestionably significant, since a party is attempting to rely on
a court's prior decision to win his or her case. 121 The degree of the governmental
abridgment of this interest is great because certain cases are barred almost absolutely,
with rare exceptions. The litigant cannot refer to the content in those cases. The
governmental interest at stake is judicial efficiency. But since the Court has held that
judicial efficiency is not enough for a compelling interest, 122 it is not enough to survive
strict scrutiny, which makes the no-citation rule unconstitutional.' 23
But is the no-citation rule content-based? As we have seen, content-based
restrictions limit communication because of the message the communication
conveys. 124 The message that a case conveys, which an attorney is attempting to cite, is
a message about what the court hearing the case has previously reasoned and decided.
But are courts really aiming at the content of those cases? Most likely, as will be
explained below, the courts are not concerned about the content of those cases and
therefore do not even want to hear what is in them. Recall, the main reason that courts
decide not to publish opinions and make them uncitable is for judicial economy. 125
These reasons are unrelated to the content of those cases.
2. Content-Neutral Restrictions
A content-neutral restriction is a restriction that is not related to the suppression of
ideas. The restrictions here limit expression without regard to the content or
communicative impact of the message conveyed. 126 Examples of content-neutral
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
121. We are not dealing here with cases that are completely unrelated to the clients' case. We
are dealing with cases that litigants believe will either be a decisive factor in the court's
determination or a persuasive source that will facilitate the court's decision. As Salem Katsh and
Alex Chachkes pointed out, "Courts retain the ability to sanction lawyers for frivolous conduct,
including, in an extreme case, the abusive citation of irrelevant decisions." Salem M. Katsh &
Alex V. Chachkes, Developments and Practice Notes: Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules,
3 J. App. PRAC. &PROCESs 287, 321 (2001).
122. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (stating the interest in "reducing the
workload on probate courts" is not weighty enough to survive even heightened scrutiny); see
also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (White, J., concurring) ("[It is] obvious.., as the
Court's assessment of the weight and value of the individual interest escalates, the less likely it
is that mere administrative convenience.., will be sufficient to justify what otherwise would
appear to be irrational discriminations.").
123. See supra note 97and accompanying text.
124. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
125. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CfH. L. Rev. 46
(1987).
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restrictions include bans on noisy speeches near hospitals, bans on billboards in certain
areas, and limits on campaign contributions.
127
Some content-neutral restrictions may have an incidental effect on the message of
some speech, but that effect does not change the restriction's content-neutral status. For
128example, in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., a city banned public nudity. Although some
individuals had the content of their messages suppressed by the ban on nudity, the
Supreme Court reasoned that government restriction on public nudity should be
evaluated under the O'Brien test as a content-neutral restriction. The Court found that
although the content of speech was incidentally affected, the law actually aimed at
"combat[ing] the negative secondary effects associated with nude dancing
establishments,"' 129 such as "violence, public intoxication, prostitution, and other
serious criminal activity."' 130 In others words, the government did not concern itself
about the content of the nudity being displayed, but about the negative effects
associated with public nudity. The city was therefore allowed to prohibit nudity since
the Court held that the city had a substantial governmental interest.
For the government to impose a content-neutral regulation, the government must
satisfy an ad hoc balancing test requiring (1) a substantial government interest and (2)
effective means of achieving that interest. These two elements are weighed against the
importance of the First Amendment interest at stake (that is, an individual's interest in
a particular form of expression, such as political speech) and the degree of abridgment
of that interest (that is, whether a person is entirely prevented from expressing him or
herself or just in certain circumstances). 131
The no-citation rule is far more likely to be content-neutral than content-based. This
is because the rule is not related to the suppression of ideas or the substance of those
cases; it does not matter whether the cases the attorney wants to cite deal with certain
subjects such as discrimination, free speech, or taxes. Unpublished decisions are
equally unciteable, regardless of the messages conveyed in those cases.
Even if the content of those unciteable cases were incidentally affected, we have
seen that if the government aims at something besides the content of the cases, the
regulation will still be held content-neutral. 132 Here, the government is aiming at saving
resources. Since the government is not aiming at content, the no-citation rule is
content-neutral.
Since the no-citation rule is content-neutral, the only questions are whether the
government has a substantial interest in judicial economy, whether its means are
effective, and whether this interest intrudes too much upon First Amendment
expression. Although some may be troubled by applying this lower standard of
scrutiny, the government is still likely to lose under this standard. First, if the
government interest is to save judicial resources, the no-citation rule does not serve this
purpose. A study by the Federal Judicial Center in 2005 indicated that many federal
judges, predicated on their experience, did not think that allowing citation would
127. Id. at 48.
128. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
129. Id. at 291.
130. Id. at 297.
131. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
132. See City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277.
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increase their workload. 133 Other scholars have also shown that the no-citation rule
does nothing to further ease the workload of appellate courts because the same volume
of cases still arises. 134 The rule does not save time in the research and writing because
judges and legal staff must still provide quality research and analysis to decide the
cases which are not citable.' 35 Therefore, the no-citation rule is not effective in
facilitating judicial economy.
Once you balance the government's interest in judicial economy, which is only
served minutely, if at all, against the First Amendment interest of litigants to cite cases,
the balance tips in favor of the First Amendment interest. Cases that are cited many
times determine the outcome of the current case. A litigant has a strong interest in
winning his or her case. A substantial number of attorneys would cite to unpublished
opinions if court rules allowed them.136 This is because citing certain unpublished
decisions could dictate the outcome, as demonstrated by Anastasof 37 and by district
courts and attorneys that continue to rely on unpublished decisions.' Almost all
would agree that there are various alternatives that the courts could employ to better
judicial economy without imposing significant costs on the litigants. 139 Therefore,
because the no-citation rules intrude too much upon First Amendment expression
without effectively serving their purpose, they are unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts of appeals are overburdened by increasing caseloads. The courts'
increasing caseload led to a significant expansion of judicial staff and unpublished
opinions. Attorneys' reliance on these unpublished opinions led to the no-citation rules.
But if the object of the courts is to reduce its workload, it seems very questionable
whether the no-citation rules serve this purpose. This makes the no-citation rules
constitutionally problematic, especially under a First Amendment analysis. Rule 32.1
does not prevent the no-citation rules from violating the Constitution because courts
can still prohibit the citation of cases decided before 2007. Therefore, the no-citation
rules should be abolished in their entirety.
133. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 3 (2005), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/
Citatio 1.pdf/$File/Citatio 1.pdf.
134. See Lance A. Wade, Honda meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument
Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695,
727 (explaining the ineffectiveness of the no-citation rule); see also Katsh & Chachkes, supra
note 121, at 320-21 (commenting on the ineffectiveness of the no-citation rule).
135. See Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 121, at 321 (arguing that when some courts have
allowed citation to some unpublished opinions, it did not increase the courts' workload).
136. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 133, at 15.
137. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
138. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 133, at 21-45.
139. See, e.g., Quitschau, supra note 70, at 876 (commenting that an "increase in clerkships
and judgeships would be just as effective and would not burden the rights of the litigants by
preventing citation of unpublished decisions"); see also DANIEL J. MEADOR & JORDANA S.
BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (providing an overview and
discussion of reforms).
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